The Moralizing Distance in Adam Smith: The Theory of Moral Sentiments as Possible Praise of Commerce by Paganelli, Maria Pia
Trinity University
Digital Commons @ Trinity
Economics Faculty Research Economics Department
2010
The Moralizing Distance in Adam Smith: The
Theory of Moral Sentiments as Possible Praise of
Commerce
Maria Pia Paganelli
Trinity University, mpaganel@trinity.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/econ_faculty
Part of the Economics Commons
This Post-Print is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics Department at Digital Commons @ Trinity. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Economics Faculty Research by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Trinity. For more information, please contact
jcostanz@trinity.edu.
Repository Citation
Paganelli, M.P. (2010). The moralizing role of distance in Adam Smith: The theory of moral sentiments as possible praise of
commerce. History of Political Economy, 42(3), 425-441. doi: 10.1215/00182702-2010-019
The Moralizing Distance in Adam Smith: The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments as Possible Praise of Commerce  
 
 
    Maria Pia Paganelli 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even if his analysis is not a blind, one-sided lauding of commerce, Adam 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations (WN) is often presented as a book that praises 
commercial societies. For Smith, commerce increases material prosperity 
and allows for freer institutions and more moral customs. By focusing 
on the role of distance in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS), this 
article proposes that TMS could also be read as a book praising com- 
mercial societies because commerce may bring about the environment 
that best facilitates moral development. 
Commerce breaks the boundaries of small and closed communities. 
Commercial societies allow for, and are based on, interactions among 
strangers. And the continuous exposure to strangers can facilitate the 
moralizing process. In TMS, Smith tells us that humankind is naturally 
biased by its self-love. Smith also tells us that each individual naturally 
desires the approbation of others. A person receives approbation when 
another individual reacts similarly or feels the same as he or she does. 
The closer one person is to another, the easier it is to share the same feel- 
ings and the less effort one has to exert to develop command over his 
passions. The farther away one is from another person, the more difficult 
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it is to share feelings. To gain the approbation of someone far away, an 
individual has to reach out and strongly control his passions. This effort, 
when repeated with consistency, will develop into a solid self-command 
that is the foundation of moral development. One can therefore infer from 
the words of TMS that commercial societies, being societies in which the 
exposure to strangers is frequent and stable, placing individuals neither 
too close nor too far away from each other, may be the most fertile ground 
for moral development. 
The reading of TMS that I propose here suggests that TMS may be 
included in the line of literature that defends commercialization from the 
accusations, so common in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, that 
it erodes values and ethics. It is consistent with recent works by Deirdre 
McCloskey (2006) and Paul Zak (2008). Both works critically summarize 
the idea, predominant since antiquity and still present today, that com- 
merce and commercial societies breed excessive greed and are detrimen- 
tal to moral development and social cooperation. Both works, as well as 
the interpretation of TMS that I propose, instead suggest that commerce 
and commercial societies may favor moral development and social coop- 
eration. McCloskey examines many centuries with her analysis of vir- 
tue ethics to show that commercial societies improve morals rather than 
destroy them. Zak and his colleagues use a variety of contemporary exper- 
imental results, while continuously mentioning Adam Smith, to point in 
the same direction. I differ from both of them in scope and method. My 
focus is limited to the textual interpretation of Adam Smith and to TMS in 
particular. 
The interpretation of TMS offered here builds upon, and adds to, at 
least two lines of interpretation of Smith that are present in the literature. 
One is the line that looks at WN as praise of commerce, the other, the one 
that looks at proximity in an attempt to integrate WN with TMS. 
The view that WN describes commerce as a positive force for mate- 
rial progress is now commonplace. Despite its admitted costs, commerce 
is the reason that an English “workman, even of the lowest and poorest 
order,” is better off than an African king (WN introduction, 4; and also 
WN I.i.11).1 It is also well recognized that in WN, the betterment of mate- 
rial conditions leads to the betterment of customs. As Jeffrey Young (1992) 
reminds us, it is thanks to the increased prosperity brought about by 
 
 
1. On the many costs and benefits of commerce in Smith, see, among others, Viner 1927, 
Fleischacker 2004, and Samuels 2007. 
  
 
 
commerce that it is possible to eliminate the poverty-driven practice of 
“directly destroying, and sometimes of abandoning . . . infants . . . old 
people, and those afflicted with lingering diseases, to perish with hunger, 
or to be devoured by wild beasts” (introduction and plan of the work, 4). 
It is also recognized by many (including, for example, Joseph Cropsey 
[(1957) 2001], Nathan Rosenberg [1968, 1990], Donald R. Stabile [1997], 
and Edwin West [1996]) that, in WN, commerce is presented and praised 
as a civilizing force that is conducive to freedom. As Robert E. Prasch 
(1991, 348) explains, 
 
To illustrate this idea of commerce as a civilizing force Smith provided 
us with the third book to The Wealth of Nations. . . . Although it is 
ostensibly about the progress of opulence in different nations, at every 
turn the argument pivots on the conclusion that it was the force of com- 
merce and capital accumulation, not the actions of any person or gov- 
ernment, that brought Europe to a state of natural liberty. In this his- 
torical discussion commerce is the force of rationalization. Commerce 
brings us to a refinement of natural liberty and a more civilized world. 
This civilized world, embodied in the victory of natural liberty, is the 
purpose of growth and progress; it provides the answer to the ethical 
purpose of the economy in Smith’s system of political economy. 
 
The interpretation of the moralizing role of distance in TMS that I 
propose here adds to this line of literature by suggesting a reading of 
TMS that is consistent with WN. TMS, like WN, can be seen as a defense 
or an endorsement of commercial societies, since commercial societies 
place individuals at the most appropriate distance to facilitate moral 
development. Furthermore, this reading of TMS would add to the non- 
constructivist ideas developed in WN, as it implies that the development 
of the moral order may in part be an unintentional consequence of com- 
merce rather than a conscious construction. 
The role of distance in TMS has also been addressed in the litera- 
ture, albeit mostly in terms of proximity. Russell Nieli’s (1986) “spheres 
of intimacy,” James Otteson’s (2002) “familiarity principles,” and 
Charles Griswold’s (1999) “circles of sympathy” are all analyses intended 
to show that “proximity—both physical and psychological familiarity— 
forms the foundation of social unity” (Weinstein 2006, 80).2 When sym- 
pathy is weakened, by increasing distance, social stability is potentially 
 
 
2. See also Forman-Barzilai 2006. 
  
 
 
jeopardized. But as sympathy diminishes, self-interest takes its place 
and commercial relationships help glue individuals back together into 
society (Cropsey [1957] 2001). 
My approach is partially similar to, yet partially different from, these 
works on proximity. I look at how an increase in distance provides incen- 
tives to develop self-command and therefore develop morally, rather than 
merely giving space to self-interest. In this, I am in concord with Richard 
Teichgraeber (1981, 117) when he claims that “it is this morally construc- 
tive interplay between Smith’s essentially stoic notion of ‘sympathy’ and 
self-interest that perhaps proved to be the starting point for what in the 
Wealth of Nations would become a more thoroughgoing ethos of eco- 
nomic individualism. For to put it very simply, what we find here is Adam 
Smith as a moral advocate of what he called a ‘society of strangers.’” But 
while Teichgraeber wants to explain “the intellectual transition from the 
Theory to the Wealth of Nations” (118),3 I would like to explore TMS as a 
solo work. I propose that TMS, even by itself, could be read as praise of 
commercial society. Adding WN to it simply enhances this proposed 
interpretation, but even on its own TMS is a book promoting commercial 
societies. 
The article develops as follows. The next two sections illustrate how, in 
TMS, Smith describes the process of developing moral conduct. The 
impartiality of our judgment, a requirement for becoming moral, is 
learned. It can be achieved through a delicate balance between our natural 
self-love and our natural desire to receive approbation from others. We 
learn impartiality and morality by observing a situation at the appropriate 
distance and by practicing a command of our passions. Being too close or 
too far away from a situation does not adequately constrain the violence of 
our passions; it distorts one’s judgment, hindering moral development. 
The third section describes how, for Smith, strangers are a source of moral 
development because they force us to develop self-command. A descrip- 
tion of the relationship between the moralizing effects of distance and 
commerce follows, showing that Smith understood commerce to have 
moralizing effects beyond simply the development of some commercial 
virtues such as punctuality, but he did not necessarily regard commerce as 
a change in customs that would eliminate wars, as some of his contempo- 
raries proposed. Concluding remarks end the essay. 
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The Development of Moral Conduct 
 
In TMS, Smith claims that there are at least two natural tendencies in 
humankind. One is that we naturally care more for ourselves than for 
others—we are naturally biased by our self-love. The other is that we natu- 
rally want our feelings to correspond with those of other people—we 
naturally desire the approbation of others. We develop moral conduct when 
our self-love and our desire for approbation interact in such a way as to 
allow us to learn how to judge our own actions as impartially as possible 
and to build morally healthy habits based on those judgments. 
Our judgment is naturally biased by our self-love, as we naturally 
consider ourselves to be the center of the universe.4  We cannot judge 
ourselves impartially because we are too self-involved. Our perspective 
is distorted since we are too close to look at ourselves with detachment. 
Similarly, if we put an object too close to our eyes, it appears distorted. 
When we do something wrong, our actions appear to us distorted by our 
self-love. We tend to have very little “sense of the disgrace” (TMS 
III.2.11–13) and tend to “turn away our view from those circumstances 
which might render that judgment unfavourable.” Our self-deception, 
caused by our inability to see ourselves as others see us because we lack 
“a more distant prospect,” not only generates “half of the disorders of 
human life,” but perpetuates them as well (TMS III.4.2–6). 
Nature offers a remedy, albeit an imperfect one, for our self-delusion— 
the desire to receive the approbation of others. When we approve of some- 
one else’s conduct, we are inspired by their behavior (TMS III.2.2). We 
want others to feel for us what we feel for them. We want to emulate them 
and to be the object of their approbation, just as their conduct was the 
object of our approbation. Similarly, when we abhor someone’s behavior, 
we take note to avoid those actions because we do not want to “render 
ourselves . . . the object of universal disapprobation” (TMS III.4.7). 
So, to understand if our actions will command the approbation or the 
disapprobation of others, we need to look at ourselves as another would 
look at us. We need to split ourselves in two, to simultaneously become an 
agent and a spectator of our actions (TMS III.1.6). We need to create some 
distance between the I-agent and the I-examiner who looks at the I-agent, 
because “we can never survey our own sentiments and motives, we can 
never form any judgment concerning them; unless we remove ourselves, 
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as it were, from our own natural station, and endeavour to view them as at 
a certain distance from us” (TMS III.i.2; emphasis added). 
Smith claims that to be able to try to see ourselves through the eyes of 
others, we actually need to see the others. The first step toward morality is 
therefore achieved with a process of socialization achieved “in no other 
way than” by using others as mirrors in which we see ourselves at a dis- 
tance (TMS III.1.2; emphasis added). The presence of others is indispens- 
able. Smith indeed claims that “were it possible that a human creature 
could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without any communi- 
cation with his own species,” he would have no moral sense because he 
would have no “looking-glass” through which he is able to see himself. 
But “bring him to society, and he is immediately provided with the mirror 
which he wanted before” (TMS III.3). Indeed, “[the eyes of other people 
are] the only looking-glass by which we can, in some measure . . . scruti- 
nize the propriety of our own conduct” (TMS III.1.5). The habitual pres- 
ence of others will generate the habit of looking at ourselves through 
someone else’s eyes. So, our moral sense will eventually grow stronger 
and more stable with habit (TMS III.1, III.1.4). 
But the presence of others will always be needed to keep that mirror in 
front of us. Without the looking glass of the presence of others, too often 
we would be at risk of being deformed by our self-love. 
 
 
The Moralizing Role of Distance 
 
We receive approbation when another individual reacts similarly to us or 
feels the same as we do (TMS I.i.3.1). We are more likely to gain some- 
one’s approbation by placing ourselves in his shoes and trying to think as 
he would. This process of placing ourselves in someone else’s shoes, with 
all its limitations, is done through the act of imagination that Smith calls 
sympathy.5 
But despite our natural sympathy, the intensity of our reaction to some- 
thing that affects us directly is naturally stronger than what we feel about 
others (TMS I.i.4.7). Indeed, since we are at different distances from 
each other (one is closer to oneself than to another), we perceive the same 
situation differently and we therefore feel differently about it. In Smith’s 
words, “My companion does not naturally look upon the misfortune that 
has befallen me, of the injury that has been done to me, from the same 
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point of view in which I consider them. They affect me much more nearly. 
We do not view them from the same station” (TMS I.i.4.5–6). 
The difference in reactions may cause interpersonal problems, as 
Smith describes: “If you have either no fellow-feeling for the misfortunes 
I have met with, or none that bears any proportion to the grief which dis- 
tracts me; or if you have either no indignation at the injuries I have suf- 
fered, or none that bears any proportion to the resentment which trans- 
ports me, we can no longer converse upon these subjects. We become 
intolerable to one another. I can neither support your company, nor you 
mine. You are confounded at my violence and passion, and I am enraged 
at your cold insensibility and want of feeling” (TMS I.i.4.5). 
To remedy, or prevent, this unfortunate “intolerable” situation that 
would cause us pain, since “nothing pleases more than to observe in other 
men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own breast” (TMS 
I.i.2.1), we reach out and try to close the gap between us and the others in 
an attempt to increase the chance that we feel similarly. So, to appeal to 
others, we “adjust the pitch of our passion,” so that we would approve of 
ourselves if we were in their place looking at us (TMS I.i.4.5–6). This is a 
process that we learn to apply whenever we face others. Eventually, we 
learn to lower the pitch of our passions even if there is no physical other.6 
But the closer one person is to another, the easier it is to share the same 
feelings about an event, and the less effort one has to exert to develop 
command over his passions. On the other hand, the farther away one is 
from another person, the more difficult it is to share feelings. To gain the 
approbation of someone relatively far away, an individual has to reach out 
and strongly control his passions. Here lies the center of the problem: If 
I, as it were, come all the way to you, you will indulge. If you come all 
the way to me, I will indulge. But if I am extremely far away from you, 
you will see the possibility of fellow-feelings as nonexistent and you 
will not even try; your judgment will maintain its bias. The same would 
happen to you if you are too far away from me. The distance to develop 
impartiality has to be the right distance. Being too close or too far away 
biases the judgment. Indeed, “the propriety of your moral sentiments is 
never so apt to be corrupted, as when the indulgent and partial spectator 
is at hand, while the indifferent and impartial one is at a great distance” 
(TMS III.3.41). 
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In Smith’s account, the corruption of our moral sentiments can be gen- 
erated by the partiality of being too close. Family and close friends risk 
being too close to us to promote a healthy moral development. They are 
too close, so they sympathize too much, letting us indulge too much in 
our passions, hindering the development of the self-command so neces- 
sary to full moral growth. Parents are too partial and indulgent with their 
children: “A very young child has no self-command; but, whatever are 
its emotions, whether fear, or grief, or anger, it endeavours always, by the 
violence of its outcries, to alarm, as much as it can, the attention of its 
nurse, or of its parents. While it remains under the custody of such par- 
tial protectors, its anger is the first and, perhaps, the only passion which it 
is taught to moderate. . . . When it is old enough to go to school, or to mix 
with its equals, it soon finds that they have no such indulgent partiality” 
(TMS III.3.20; emphasis added). And close friends, with their warm com- 
fort, let us abandon ourselves to our weaknesses, exactly because they 
are very close to us: “Yet by relating their misfortunes they in some mea- 
sure renew their grief. They awaken in their memory the remembrance of 
those circumstances which occasioned their affliction. Their tears accord- 
ingly flow faster than before, and they are apt to abandon themselves to 
all the weakness of sorrow. They take pleasure, however, in all this, and 
it is evident, are sensibly relieved by it; because the sweetness of his sym- 
pathy more than compensates the bitterness of that sorrow, which, in 
order to excite his sympathy, they had thus enlivened and renewed” (TMS 
I.i.2.4; emphasis added). Smith repeats this point again in a different way 
later in the book: “Modern good manners, which are extremely indulgent 
to human weakness, forbid, for some time, the visits of strangers to per- 
sons under great family distress, and permit those only of the nearest rela- 
tions and most intimate friends. The presence of the latter, it is thought, 
will impose less restraint than that of the former; and the sufferers can 
more easily accommodate themselves to the feelings of those, from whom 
they have reasons to expect a more indulgent sympathy” (TMS III.3.24; 
emphasis added). 
But while too little distance causes laxness and partiality in our judg- 
ments, excessive distance also causes biases and improper moral devel- 
opment. If one is too far away, there is a risk of too much indifference. 
Smith indeed notices that children’s lack of respect for their parents and 
their weak domestic morality, observable “in the higher ranks,” is most 
likely due to having sent the children to boarding schools too far away 
from home (TMS VI.ii.1.10). Similarly, foreign nations, especially if “at 
  
 
 
variance,” are too far away from each other, so that “the citizen of each 
pays little regard to the sentiments which foreign nations may entertain 
concerning his conduct.” Likewise, by decreasing social distance inter- 
nally, factions generate too much distance between themselves and non- 
members. Partiality “is at hand,” justice is disregarded, and one can aban- 
don oneself to “hostile passions” (TMS III.3.42). 
An excess or a defect of distance lets us indulge in the violence of 
our passions. The right distance instead lets us develop impartiality in 
our judgments. Indeed, being at the proper distance from another gives us 
incentives to develop command over our passions so that we can become 
the object of approbation and even of applause. Impartiality in judging 
ourselves and others, the key to moral development, is achieved by look- 
ing at ourselves as if from the point of view of a third party, who is not 
directly involved with either of us because he is not too close and not too 
far. And just as we learn to perceive physical distance through experi- 
ence, so that we know that the window next to which we sit is not larger 
than the “distant mountains” we see through it, in the same manner we 
learn to deal with moral magnitudes by experiencing moral distances 
(TMS III.3.2–3). Smith tells us indeed that 
 
the loss or gain of a very small interest of our own, appears to be of 
vastly more importance, excites a much more passionate joy or sor- 
row, a much more ardent desire or aversion, than the greatest concern 
of another with whom we have no particular connexion. . . . As to the 
eye of the body, objects appear great or small, not so much according 
to their real dimensions, as according to the nearness or distance of 
their situation; so do they likewise to what may be called the natural 
eye of the mind: and we remedy the defects of both these organs in 
pretty much the same manner. . . . I can form a just comparison 
between those great objects and the little objects around me, in no 
other way, than by transporting myself, at least in fancy, to a different 
station, from whence I can survey both at nearly equal distances, and 
thereby form some judgment of their real proportions. Habit and 
experience have taught me to do this so easily and so readily, that I am 
scarce sensible that I do it. (TMS III.3.3) 
 
The deceptive powers of our self-love are stronger than those of the 
eye of the body. They are difficult to tame, they need “a discipline which 
the practice of the longest life is very seldom sufficient to bring to complete 
perfection” (TMS III.3.22). To develop the ability of “transporting myself, 
  
 
 
at least in fancy, to a different station, from whence I can survey both at 
nearly equal distances, and thereby form some judgment of their real pro- 
portions” (TMS III.3.2) and to look with the eyes of a third person, we 
need to practice habitually dealing with people who “had no particular 
connexion with either [of us]” (TMS III.3.3). These people are strangers. 
 
 
Strangers as a Source of Moral Development 
 
Smith seems animated about the fact that we learn self-command through 
the presence of strangers, from early schooling on. And the more we inter- 
act with strangers, the more we develop self-command, and the more self- 
command we have the more virtuous we are. It is this effort, consistently 
repeated, that will develop into solid self-command that is the founda- 
tion of moral development. Practice and habit will make the impartial- 
ity stick. 
So, when “a very young child” is sent to school or to play with other 
children, and “it naturally wishes to gain their favour, and to avoid their 
hatred or contempt . . . it soon finds that it can do so in no other way than 
by moderating, not only its anger, but all its other passions, to the degree 
which its play-fellows and companions are likely to be pleased with. It 
thus enters into the great school of self-command, it studies to be more 
and more master of itself, and begins to exercise over its own feelings a 
discipline which the practice of the longest life is very seldom sufficient 
to bring to complete perfection” (TMS III.3.22). 
The idea that it is through increasing the distance between us and oth- 
ers that we develop the self-command needed to develop morally is pre- 
sented right from the beginning of TMS. In TMS I.i.4.9, indeed, we find 
the following description of how we regain tranquillity in time of distress, 
by increasing the distance between the people with whom we interact: 
 
The mind, therefore, is rarely so disturbed, but that the company of a 
friend will restore it to some degree of tranquility and sedateness. . . . 
We are immediately put in mind of the light in which he will view our 
situation, and we begin to view it ourselves in the same light. . . . We 
expect less sympathy from a common acquaintance than from a friend: 
we cannot open to the former all those little circumstances which we 
can unfold to the latter: we assume, therefore, more tranquility before 
him, and endeavour to fix our thought upon those general outlines of 
our situation which he is willing to consider. We expect even still less 
sympathy from an assembly of strangers, and we assume, therefore, 
  
 
 
still more tranquility before them, and always endeavour to bring down 
our passion to that pitch, which the particular company we are in may 
be expected to go along with. Nor is this only an assumed appearance: 
for if we are at all masters of ourselves, the presence of a mere acquain- 
tance will really compose us, still more than that of a friend; and that of 
an assembly of strangers still more than that of an acquaintance. (TMS 
I.i.4.9; emphasis added) 
 
In book III, Smith continues and strengthens this idea that it is through 
social interaction, especially with strangers, that we “restore the mind to 
its tranquility.” There, he repeats that “in all private misfortunes, in pain, 
in sickness, in sorrow, the weakest man, when his friends, and still more 
when a stranger visits him, is immediately impressed with the view in 
which they are likely to look upon his situation” (TMS III.3.23). 
Smith then goes on, extensively, in describing the beneficial and mor- 
alizing effects of being with strangers. Strangers will force us to contain 
our whining in our bad times and will prevent us from developing too 
much arrogance in good times. It is a section that is worth quoting in 
full, given the effectiveness of Smith’s words: 
 
In solitude, we are apt to feel too strongly whatever relates to ourselves: 
we are apt to over-rate the good offices we may have done, and the inju- 
ries we may have suffered: we are apt to be too much elated by our own 
good, and too much dejected by our own bad fortune. The conversa- 
tion of a friend brings us to a better, that of a stranger to a still better 
temper. The man within the breast, the abstract and ideal spectator of 
our sentiments and conduct, requires often to be awakened and put in 
mind of his duty, by the presence of the real spectator: and it is always 
from that spectator, from whom we can expect the least sympathy 
and indulgence, that we are likely to learn the most complete lesson 
of self-command. 
 
Are you in adversity? Do not mourn in the darkness of solitude, do 
not regulate your sorrow according to the indulgent sympathy of your 
intimate friends; return, as soon as possible, to the day-light of the 
world and of society. Live with strangers, with those who know noth- 
ing, or care nothing about your misfortune. 
 
Are you in prosperity? Do not confine the enjoyment of your good 
fortune to your own house, to the company of your own friends, per- 
haps of your flatterers, of those who build upon your fortune the hopes 
of mending their own; frequent those who are independent of you, 
  
 
 
who can value you only for your character and conduct, and not for 
your fortune. . . . if, by the simplicity of your unassuming demeanour, 
you can gain their favour and kindness, you may rest satisfied that you 
are modest enough, and that your head has been in no respect turned 
by your good fortune. (TMS III.3.38– 40; emphases added) 
 
This continuous lowering of the pitch of our passions is an effective train- 
ing ground for self-command, so that we can hope to reach the point where 
“habit and experience have taught [us] to do this so easily and so readily, 
that [we are] scarce sensible that [we] do it” (TMS III.3.2). 
The more effortlessly, the more “mechanically” (TMS III.3.23), we are 
able to respond and control our passions, the more we have been success- 
fully trained in the school of self-command. The progression of the ability 
to command our passions that Smith offers us is indicative of the power of 
habit. A child has no self-command until he is exposed to his peers in 
school. A “weak man” is “like a child that has not yet gone to school” 
(TMS III.3.23), while the “man of a little more firmness” is able to moder- 
ate his passion, but if “he has not . . . been well inured to the hard disci- 
pline of self-command, he soon grows weary of this restraint” (TMS 
III.3.24). It is only “the wise and just man who has been thoroughly bred 
in the great school of self-command.” It is “in the bustle and business of 
the world” that “the man of real constancy and firmness . . . has been in 
the constant practice and, indeed, under the constant necessity, of model- 
ling, or endeavouring to model, not only his outward conduct and behav- 
iour, but, as much as he can, even his inward sentiments and feelings, 
according to those of this awful and respectable judge. He does not merely 
affect the sentiments of the impartial spectator. He really adopts them. He 
almost identifies himself with, he almost becomes himself that impartial 
spectator, and scarce even feels but as that great arbiter of his conduct 
directs him to feel” (TMS III.3.25; emphases added). 
 
 
Moral Distance in Commerce 
 
If we read TMS with an eye on distance, we could see that the kind of 
society in which we are most likely and/or most frequently placed in the 
conditions to be at the right distance from others is a commercial society. 
Commercial societies are indeed societies of strangers.7  We have our 
family and our friends, but we are also in constant interaction with peo- 
 
7. See Seabright 2004. 
  
 
 
ple we do not know. It may happen that our brewer is also our friend, but 
most likely our baker does not know our names, nor would our butcher 
care to know. In front of them, we have to compose ourselves, control our 
passions. While we can and do burst into tears with our close friends in 
case of a large emotional loss, it is inappropriate for us to cry in a public 
place (so Smith contends) and unlikely that we will do it. In a public 
place, we will push back our tears and our sighs, trying to control and 
compose ourselves. The more we try to do it, the easier it will become, 
and the more likely we will be able to internalize the behavior, acquiring 
moral strength. And since in a commercial society there are many situa- 
tions in which one has to be in contact with strangers, one has many 
chances to train one’s self-command. And through the habit of interact- 
ing with strangers, we develop that habit of self-command that is neces- 
sary for strong morality and virtuous rules of conduct. In TMS, commer- 
cial societies seem to be indirectly praised as a locus in which moral 
development could be most fruitful. 
Although the focus of this article is TMS, a glance at WN seems nec- 
essary. With WN, Smith’s picture of the role of distance in the moraliza- 
tion process, and therefore of a society in which individuals are placed 
at a distance, is corroborated, and yet qualified. 
In WN V.i.g.12 we hear that, for “a man of low condition,” finding the 
right distance in commercial societies may not always be easy. Moving 
from his small village to a great city, he abandons an environment with 
close personal ties for one in which he “is observed and attended to by 
nobody.” Others are too far away to play a positive role in controlling his 
“low profligacy and vice.” In some cases, to compensate for his excessive 
distance from others, the debauched villager may fall into relationships 
characterized by too little distance: he may fall into the hands of a small 
religious sect and be punished “by what is always a very severe punish- 
ment” so that he will follow the morals of sects that “have frequently been 
rather disagreeably rigorous and unsocial.” Smith suggests that to gen- 
erate the appropriate moral distance there are two tools: the “study of 
science and philosophy” (WN V.i.g.14) and “publick diversions” (WN 
V.i.g.15). Science and philosophy offer a different perspective, training us 
to change our point of view, and “publick diversions,” such as theater per- 
formances, are also very strong training grounds for putting ourselves in 
the place of others (Marshall 1986). 
Similarly, while commerce may generate the right distance for moral 
development for most, it may also generate too little, or too much distance 
  
 
 
for others. Great merchants and manufacturers indeed find themselves at 
a very close proximity to each other. This proximity biases their views 
and allows them to generate cartels, so detrimental to the general public. 
Additionally, a dense concentration of merchants can be accompanied by 
a great distance between their customers and people living in the faraway 
countries where the merchants have other commercial interests. Mer- 
chants and manufacturers are willing and able to bring a country into war 
“for the sake of that little enhancement of price” (WN IV.viii.53), and their 
fellow-citizens, “who live in the capital, and in the provinces remote from 
the scene of action . . . enjoy, at their ease, the amusement of reading in the 
newspapers the exploits of their own fleets and armies” (WN V.iii.37). To 
these defects and excesses of distance, Smith does not offer a clear rem- 
edy, save perhaps the policy prescriptions and the appeals to the laws of 
justice. 
This particular consideration—that commerce may induce wars because 
great merchants and manufacturers want to open new markets, and because 
citizens enjoy reading the news of the wars and the dreams of empire (if 
they are far from the front and if they do not have to pay for the war thanks 
to the use of public debt to finance it)—makes Smith stand out among 
eighteenth-century authors who believe commerce brings better and 
“softer” customs. Actually, even Smith worries that commerce softens the 
spirit, making poor soldiers, but this does not mean that he thinks that 
peace is a necessary consequence. 
The reading of the role of distance in TMS proposed here—that com- 
mercial societies offer the conditions under which it is most likely that an 
individual is placed at the appropriate distance to develop morally—is 
consistent, with some caveats, with a common theme that emerged in the 
eighteenth century, despite differing predictions about whether universal 
peace is a necessary consequence of commerce. That common theme is 
what Albert Hirschman ([1977] 1997) refers to as the doux commerce.8 
The introduction of commerce changes the character and disposition of 
men, making them less violent and more sociable, as Montesquieu ([1748] 
1989) and David Hume ([1752] 1985) in particular suggest. 
Focusing on the moralizing effect of (the right) distance also places TMS 
in a line of thinking that goes back to at least Aristotle. Carlo Ginzburg 
(1994, 49) notes “the contradictory implications stressed by Aristotle both 
 
8. See also Clark 2007. 
  
 
 
in his Poetics and in his Rhetoric. If extreme distance leads to indifference, 
extreme closeness can lead either to pity or to destructive rivalry. This 
ambivalence . . . found a powerful expression on the Greek stage.” But 
while Smith seems, implicitly at least, to see that commercial societies may 
help us to find the right distance, Ginzburg shows a tension in authors such 
as Diderot and Balzac regarding the moral implication of distance between 
“a general idea of just and unjust in accordance with nature” and the 
increasing social distance that “in bourgeois society [makes] it . . . difficult 
to observe moral obligation, including the most basic ones” (55). 
The reading of distance in TMS proposed here is also consistent with 
the reading of Smith proposed by Jerry Evensky (2005). Evensky’s idea is 
that, in Smith, “ethical maturation is an ongoing process because the ideal 
is a limit—we can forever refine our values as we approach it, but we can 
never achieve it” (47). Evensky indeed describes Smith as telling the story 
of the coevolution of individuals and social norms of ethics, a story in 
which not only change but progress occurs. “In this story, human nature 
is constant (we are not ‘better’ than our predecessor), but human charac- 
ter evolves along with human institutions, and these have the capacity to 
mature toward the ideal” (56). The presence of commerce, and the dis- 
tance that it generates among individuals, would indeed generate that 
moral environment that would fit in the story of coevolution and maturity 
toward the ideal. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Focusing on the role of distance in the moralizing process in TMS, this 
article proposes that TMS could be interpreted as a defense of commercial 
societies. In TMS, Smith explains that being too close or too far away 
from others keeps us in our indulgent partiality, which is detrimental for 
moral development. Strangers, on the other hand, allow us to train our- 
selves to be at the appropriate distance to develop impartiality. Dealing 
with strangers forces us to build and strengthen self-command to control 
our passions, which is the basis of moral development. Frequent inter- 
actions with strangers foster the habit of virtue. Since commercial societ- 
ies are societies of strangers, we can infer that commercial societies are a 
fertile ground for moral development. With this reading, Smith would 
appear to praise commerce not only in WN, but also in TMS—because 
commerce can make us not only wealthy but also moral. 
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